UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/27
17 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Pursuant to paragraph 4 (b) of the note by the President of the Security Council dated 30 October 1998 (S/1998/1016) and following consultations among the members of the Council under the no-objection procedure, the members of the Council agreed to elect the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of the following sanctions committees for a period running until 31 December 2000:

Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Peter van Walsum (Netherlands)

Vice-Chairmen: Argentina and Ukraine

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 748 (1992) concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Volodymyr Yu. Yel'chenko (Ukraine)

Vice-Chairmen: Bangladesh and Jamaica

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Said Ben Mustapha (Tunisia)

Vice-Chairmen: Jamaica and Netherlands

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Robert R. Fowler (Canada)

Vice-Chairmen: Argentina and Malaysia

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) concerning Rwanda:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Hasmy Agam (Malaysia)

Vice-Chairmen: Canada and Tunisia

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 985 (1995) concerning Liberia:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Martin Andjaba (Namibia)

Vice-Chairmen: Canada and Malaysia

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Anwarul Karim Chowdhury (Bangladesh)

Vice-Chairmen: Mali and Namibia

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998):

Chairperson: Her Excellency Ms. M. Patricia Durrant, CD (Jamaica)

Vice-Chairmen: Netherlands and Tunisia

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Afghanistan:

Chairman: His Excellency Mr. Arnoldo Manuel Listre (Argentina)

Vice-Chairmen: Mali and Ukraine

2. The Bureau of each of the above-mentioned sanctions committees will be composed as above for a term ending on 31 December 2000.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/28
17 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period from 16 July 1999 to 15 January 2000)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 1254 (1999) of 30 July 1999, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further period of six months, until 31 January 2000. It covers developments since the previous report, dated 21 July 1999 (S/1999/807).

II. SITUATION IN THE AREA OF OPERATION

2. During the past six months, hostilities continued at a somewhat reduced level between the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and their local Lebanese auxiliary, the de facto forces (DFF), on the one hand, and armed elements who have proclaimed their resistance against the Israeli occupation, on the other. Armed elements initiated fewer large-scale operations and, on occasion, refrained from retaliatory measures. The DFF were subjected to tighter control by the IDF, resulting in less firing into populated areas. Civilian casualties decreased; 4 civilians were killed during the reporting period, as compared to 19 in the previous period and 12 in the period from July 1998 to January 1999.

3. A significant political development for the region was the resumption, in December 1999, of negotiations between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, under the auspices of the United States of America.

4. UNIFIL recorded 360 operations by armed elements against IDF/DFF (29 in the second half of July, 73 in August, 41 in September, 73 in October, 62 in November, 62 in December and 20 in the first half of January). There were also reports of some 100 operations north of the Litani River. The vast majority of these operations were carried out by the Islamic Resistance, the military wing of the Shiite Muslim Hizballah organization. The Shiite movement AMAL took responsibility for some 65 operations, while the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad, which had not been active in the area for two years, took responsibility

for two operations; a few were attributed to other Lebanese groups. The armed elements employed small arms, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, recoilless rifles, rocket, artillery and explosive devices. They fired some 3,200 mortar, artillery, rocket and anti-tank rounds, as compared to about 3,700 rounds in the previous reporting period.

5. IDF/DFF, in response to attacks or in operations they initiated, employed artillery, mortars, tanks, helicopter gun ships, fixed-wing aircraft and explosive devices. UNIFIL recorded over 11,600 artillery, mortar, tank and missile rounds fired by IDF/DFF, as compared to 15,000 in the previous period. While IDF continued its practice of conducting pre-emptive artillery bombardments, it relied more heavily on air raids as a retaliatory measure. There were 88 air raids both inside and outside the area of operation. As before, the Israeli navy patrolled Lebanese territorial waters in the south and continued to impose restrictions on local fishermen.

6. In the area where it is deployed, UNIFIL continued its efforts to limit the conflict and to protect the inhabitants from the fighting through its network of checkpoints and observation posts, an active programme of patrolling, and continuous contacts with the parties. The Force was also deployed, as necessary, to provide a measure of protection to villages and to farmers working in the fields: altogether 113 harvest patrol and escorts were provided. Nevertheless, in the UNIFIL area of operation, there were several incidents in which civilians were killed or injured. On 3 August, a woman was wounded in the village of Al Mansuri (located on the coast near Al Bayyadah) by a mortar round fired by IDF/DFF. The next day, armed elements detonated a road-side bomb near Al Bayyadah, killing the civilian driver of a truck, who was employed by IDF/DFF. On 29 August, four civilians were injured at Al-Mansuri by IDF/DFF shelling. On 14 October, a young girl was injured by a rocket fired from an Israeli aircraft. On 29 October, three civilians were injured near Al Bayyadah by rockets fired by armed elements. On 12 November and 15 December, one civilian was wounded near Hula and one near Bayt Yahun by armed element fire. On 6 December, a civilian was killed and two others were injured near Al Mansuri by IDF tank fire. There were two mine incidents, in which one civilian was injured near Bayt Lif (25 October) and one near Qabrikha (20 December) by an anti-personnel mine, resulting in the loss of a limb.

7. There were other reports of serious incidents from outside the area of operation. On 1 September, two civilians were killed in Libbaya by IDF/DFF shelling. On 16 December, 15 school children were injured, some of them seriously, in Arab Salim, when two mortar rounds fired by IDF/DFF impacted on the schoolyard. IDF issued a public apology for this shelling; armed elements did not retaliate.

8. Within the Israeli-controlled area, Israel continued to maintain a civil administration and security service. The infrastructure in the area (road system, electricity, water supply, and public buildings) continued to be improved with funds provided by the Government of Lebanon. However, the area remained economically dependent on Israel, where more than 2,500 of the inhabitants go to work every day.

9. IDF/DFF conducted search operations for arms in several villages in the Israeli-controlled area and, from time to time, restricted the movement of the inhabitants. A number of persons were arrested and imprisoned in Khiam, while others were expelled from their villages and ordered to leave the area.

10. In performing its tasks, the Force at times encountered hostile reactions. There were two incidents in which United Nations personnel were threatened and harassed by armed elements. Strong protests were made about these incidents through the Lebanese Army.

11. UNIFIL itself was targeted on several occasions. For example, on 23 September, a United Nations armoured personnel carrier went over an explosive device planted by armed elements near Buyut as Sayyid. Three Fijian soldiers sustained injuries. On 6 October, IDF/DFF fired a mortar round at a United Nations position near Frun, fortunately causing only minor damage.

12. In July 1996, UNIFIL obtained a commitment from IDF to respect a safety zone around UNIFIL positions and received assurances from the Islamic Resistance that they would not operate in the vicinity of UNIFIL positions. Regrettably, these commitments were frequently broken by the personnel of both sides. In particular, incidents of armed elements operating from close to United Nations positions increased, reaching a high of 21 in December. Roughly half of these incidents are attributable to the Islamic Resistance and the other half to AMAL. The number of firings at or close to United Nations positions and personnel totalled 164 (116 by IDF/DFF, 37 by armed elements and 11 that could not be attributed), which was almost the same level as in the last reporting period. The United Nations strongly protested about these incidents to the authorities concerned.

13. UNIFIL continued to assist the civilian population in the form of medical care, harvest patrols, water projects, equipment or services for schools and orphanages, and supplies to social services and needy people. Such assistance was provided from resources made available by troop-contributing countries. UNIFIL medical centres and mobile teams provided care to an average of 5,000 civilian patients per month and a field dental programme treated approximately 200 cases per month. UNIFIL also assisted the Government of Lebanon in transporting and distributing supplies to villages in the Israeli-controlled area when they faced shortages owing to restrictions imposed by IDF/DFF. UNIFIL cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other organizations and agencies operating in Lebanon. On 21 December, UNIFIL facilitated and provided logistic support for an ICRC operation to retrieve the bodies of the Islamic Resistance members killed in the past fighting.

14. As in the past, UNIFIL continued the disposal of unexploded ordnance in its area of operation. In all, 60 controlled explosions were carried out.

15. The monitoring group set up in accordance with the understanding of 26 April 1996 held 12 meetings at UNIFIL headquarters to consider complaints by Israel and Lebanon. UNIFIL provided facilities for the meetings as well as transport and other logistic support for the members of the group.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

16. As of January 2000, UNIFIL comprised 4,504 troops from Fiji (600), Finland (494), France (245), Ghana (653), India (619), Ireland (612), Italy (46), Nepal (604) and Poland (631). UNIFIL was assisted in its tasks by 51 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). In addition, UNIFIL employed 460 civilian staff, of whom 116 were recruited internationally and 344 locally. Major General Jioji Konousi Konrote returned to his national service on 30 September 1999, handing over to his deputy, Brigadier General James Sreenan, as Acting Force Commander. Major General Seth Kofi Obeng assumed command on 1 December. The deployment of UNIFIL is shown on the attached map.

17. I regret to report the death of two members of the Force. An Irish soldier was killed in a traffic accident. A Fijian soldier died of natural causes. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 229 members of the Force have lost their lives: 77 as a result of firings or bomb explosions, 94 in accidents and 58 from other causes. A total of 341 were wounded by firing, or by mine or bomb explosions.

18. UNIFIL maintained close contact with the Lebanese authorities on matters of mutual concern. Those authorities provided valuable assistance in connection with the rotation of troops and logistic activities in Beirut. At times, the Lebanese army was helpful in defusing confrontations with armed elements. It also provided accommodation for some UNIFIL contingents on leave in Lebanon. The Force continued to cooperate with the Lebanese Internal Security Forces on matters pertaining to the maintenance of law and order.

19. The problem of the rents owed by the Government of Lebanon to the owners of the land and premises used by UNIFIL has still not been resolved. Not all owners have received payment and there is continuing controversy over the lists of owners prepared by the Lebanese authorities.

IV. FINANCIAL MATTERS

20. The General Assembly, by its resolution 53/227 of 8 June 1999, appropriated to the Special Account for UNIFIL an amount of $148.9 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $12.4 million gross, for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNIFIL, the cost of maintaining the Force would be limited to the monthly rate approved by the General Assembly.

21. As at 31 December 1999, unpaid assessments to the Special Account for UNIFIL for the period since its inception to 31 January 2000 amounted to $108.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,482.1 million.

V. OBSERVATIONS

22. During the past six months, fighting continued in south Lebanon and the situation in the area remained volatile, although the level of hostility was somewhat reduced and civilian casualties decreased. I urge the parties to continue to exercise restraint and respect the non-combatant status of civilians.

23. A significant political development in the region was the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic as brokered by the United States of America. I shall continue to follow this matter closely and revert to the Council should there be any change in the situation relevant to the implementation of resolution 425 (1978).

24. The Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations, in a letter addressed to me on 28 December 1999 (S/1999/1284), conveyed his Government's request that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of six months. While UNIFIL continues to be prevented from implementing the mandate contained in Security Council resolution 425 (1978), its contribution to stability and the protection it is able to afford the population of the area remain important. I therefore recommend that the Security Council respond positively to the request of the Government of Lebanon and extend the mandate of UNIFIL for another period of six months, until 31 July 2000.

25. I must again draw attention to the serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to $108.7 million. This represents money owed to the Member States contributing the troops that make up the Force. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears. I should like to express my gratitude to the Governments contributing troops to the Force, in particular those of developing countries, for their understanding and patience in these difficult circumstances.

26. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major General Jioji Konousi Konrote, Brigadier General James Sreenan and Major General Seth Kofi Obeng, and to the men and women serving with UNIFIL for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult and often dangerous task. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves and on their countries as well as on the United Nations.

وزع بعثة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
في شهر كانون الثاني/يناير ٢٠٠٠

2000 年1月联黎部队的部署情形

UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JANUARY 2000
DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL EN JANVIER 2000
ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ЯНВАРЬ 2000
DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN ENERO DE 2000

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

LEBANON
ISRAEL
SEA
MEDITERRANEAN

FINBATT
GHANBATT
FIJIBATT
NEPBATT
IRISHBATT
INDBATT

HQ UNIFIL
LOG POLAND
COMP FRANCE
ITALY
MP COMPOSITE
POLAND
OGL

Kasmiyah, Anṣār, Az Zrārīyah, An Nabaṭīyah at Taḥtā, Habbūsh, Kafer Roumâne, Aichîye, Ouardîye, Mourhbîye, Mazra'at Ouazaiye, Mahmoûdîye, Kaoukaba, Râsbayyā, Blâte, Marj 'Uyûn, Ebel es Saqi, Tell Dibbine, Khardala, Râchaiya el Foukhâr, Shab'â, Kafr Tibnit, Arnûn, Al Qulay'ah, Al Khiyâm, El Méri, Kafer Choûba, Qa'qa'iyat al Jisr, Zawṭar ash Sharqîyah, Chateau de Beaufort, Yohmor, Khéubé, Dayr Mîmâs, Akiya, Burj Raḥḥāl, Bidyās, Ḥallūsîyat at Taḥta, Dayr Qānūn an Nahr, 'Abbāsîyah, Ṭayr Falsayh, Humayrī, Shhûr, Frun, Shabriha, Ṭūrā, Ṣūr (Tyre), TRANSIT BASE, Ṭayr Dibbah, Ma'rakah, Marub, Arzūn, Ṣrīfā, Bārish, Bāfliyah, Sil ā, Dayr Kifa, Burj Qāliawiyah, Qabrikhā, Tūlin, Itt Taibé, Al Qantarah, Kafer Kela, Metûlla, Majdal Shams, Burj ash Shamālī, Yānūḥ, Al Bazūrîyah, Ar Rashidîyah, Wadi Jilu, Jwayya, Ṭayr Zibna, Kafr Dūnin, As Sawwanah, Misgav'am, Bani Hayyan, Kefar Gil'adi, Markabā, Qiryat Shemona, Ra's al 'Ayn, Ayn B'āl, Hannawîyah, Dayr Qānūn, Dayr Nṭār, Bir as Sanasil, Khirbat Silm, Majdal Silm, As Sultaniyah, Hūlā, Ramin, Mazra'at al Mushrif, Qānā, Al Qulaylah, Ramādîyah, Al Bayyad, Rishknāniyah, Tibnīn, Safad, Shaqrah, Al Yātūn, Aṣ Ṣiddiqin, Al Hinniyah, Kafrā, Ḥarīs, Ayta az Zutt, Al Qulay'ah, Bra'shit, Mays al Jabal, Buyūt as Sayyid, Zibqīn, Ḥadāthah, Al Bayyāḍah, Tallet Huqban, Sribbin, Bayt Yahun, Ra's ad Durayjāt, Majdal Zūn, Shama, Yāṭar, Kūnin, Blīdā, Rshāf, Aṣ Ṣīrī, Jabal Bāṣil, Ṣaff al Hawa, 'Aynātā, Tayr Harfa, Bayt Lif, Shiḥīn, Dibil, Bint Jubayl, Aytarun, An Nāqūrah, 'Almā ash Sha'b, Yārīn, Ayn Ibil, Mārūn ar Ra's, Ramot Naftali, Ayta ash Sha'b, Ra's an Nāqūrah (Rosh Haniqra), Hanita, Shelomi, Rumaysh, Yārūn, Elon, Kerem Ben Zimra, 'Alma

NAQOURA, LAB (OGL), HIN (OGL), KHIAM (OGL), MAR (OGL), RAS (OGL)

160°000E, 170, 180, 190, 200, 210, 220°000E
310°000N, 300, 290, 280°000N
35° 20', 35° 30', 35° 40', 33° 20', 33° 10'

0 1 2 3 4 5 km
0 1 2 3 mi

The designations employed and the presentation of the material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

Map No. 3000 Rev. 47
January 2000
UNITED NATIONS

مركز مراقبة 1-24 观察所
Observation post
Poste d'observation
Наблюдательный пункт
Puesto de observación

نقطة تفتيش 1-28 检查站
Check point
Point de controle
Контрольный пункт
Puesto de control

قاعدة 6-4 基地
Base
Base
База
Base

موقع مؤقت 临时阵地
Temporary position
Position temporaire
Временная позиция
Posición provisional

الحدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter-Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza

حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte

وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa

موقع لقوات الدفاع الإسرائيلية و/أو «جيش جنوب لبنان»
以色列国防军和(或)"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

الامتداد الشمالي المنطقة التي تسيطر عليها إسرائيل
以色列控制地区向北延伸部分
Northward extension of Israeli controlled area
Extension vers le nord de la zone contrôlée par Israel
Северная часть территории, контролируемой Израилем
Extensión septentrional de la zona controlada por Israel

المساحة التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الأمم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况
Approximate area under Israeli control in UNIFIL area of operation
Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israelien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля
Area aproximada bajo control israeli dentro de la zone de operaciones de la Fuerza

0 1 2 3 4 5 km
0 1 2 3 mi

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/2000/29
18 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions and statements by its President on the situation in Burundi,

Expressing concern at the dire economic, humanitarian and social conditions in Burundi,

Expressing deep concern at the ongoing violence and insecurity in Burundi marked by increased attacks by armed groups on the civilian population in and around the capital,

Noting with concern the implications of the situation in Burundi for the region as well as the consequences for Burundi of continued regional instability,

Recognizing the important role of the States of the region, in particular Tanzania, which is host to hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees and home to the Julius Nyerere Foundation, which has provided outstanding support to the talks,

Noting that the United Nations agencies, regional and non-governmental organizations, in cooperation with host Governments, are making use of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53 and Add.1-2), inter alia, in Africa,

Welcoming the human rights programme undertaken by the United Nations and the cooperation afforded to it by the Government of Burundi and political parties in Burundi,

Reaffirming that the renewed Arusha peace process represents the most viable basis for a resolution of the conflict together with the continued efforts to build an internal political partnership in Burundi,

1. Warmly endorses and strongly supports the designation by the Eighth Arusha Regional Summit on 1 December 1999 of Nelson Mandela, former President of the Republic of South Africa, as the new Facilitator of the Arusha peace

process, successor to the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, expresses its strongest support for his efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict in Burundi, and welcomes the successful meeting in Arusha on 16 January 2000 launching his initiative;

2. Reiterates its strong support for the renewed Arusha peace process, endorses the call at the Eighth Arusha Regional Summit for all parties to the conflict in Burundi to extend maximum cooperation to the new peace process Facilitator, and calls for increased efforts to build an internal political partnership in Burundi;

3. Endorses efforts by the Secretary-General to enhance the role of the United Nations in Burundi, and in particular the continued work of his Special Representative for the Great Lakes region;

4. Commends those Burundian parties, including the Government, that have demonstrated their commitment to continue negotiations, and calls on all parties that remain outside the Arusha peace process to cease hostilities and to participate fully in that process;

5. Expresses appreciation for international donor support, and appeals for increased assistance for the Arusha peace process;

6. Condemns continuing violence perpetrated by all parties, and in particular by those non-State actors who refuse to participate in the Arusha peace process, and strongly urges all parties to end the ongoing armed conflict and to resolve their differences peacefully;

7. Condemns attacks against civilians in Burundi, and calls for an immediate end to these criminal acts;

8. Strongly condemns the murder of United Nations Children's Fund and World Food Programme personnel and Burundian civilians in Rutana province in October 1999, and urges that the perpetrators be effectively brought to justice;

9. Calls for all parties to ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Burundi, and to guarantee fully the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

10. Calls for the immediate, full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian workers and human rights observers to all regroupment camps, and calls for internees to have access to their livelihoods outside these camps;

11. Encourages further progress between the United Nations and the Government of Burundi and political parties in Burundi in establishing appropriate security guarantees for United Nations humanitarian agencies to resume field operations;

12. Calls upon neighbouring States, where appropriate, to take measures to halt cross-border insurgent activity, and the illicit flow of arms and

ammunition, and to ensure the neutrality, security, and civilian character of refugee camps;

13. Calls for donors to provide humanitarian and human rights assistance to Burundi and to resume substantial economic and development assistance with due regard to security conditions;

14. Urges the international community to examine the economic development needs of Burundi with a view to establishing stable long-term conditions for the well-being of the Burundian people and for the return of refugees;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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17 January 2000

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 4 of its resolution 1279 (1999) of 30 November 1999, the Security Council decided that the personnel authorized under its resolutions 1258 (1999) and 1273 (1999), including a multidisciplinary staff of personnel in the fields of human rights, humanitarian affairs, public information, medical support, child protection, political affairs and administrative support, which would assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, should constitute the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 1 March 2000.

2. By paragraph 8 of that resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed and to report to it as soon as possible on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and submit his recommendations on further deployment of United Nations personnel in the country and on their protection.

II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PEACE PROCESS

3. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (S/1999/815) provided for the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC) which, together with the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), would "be responsible for executing ... peacekeeping operations until the deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping force". The Agreement also provided for the establishment of a ministerial-level Political Committee. At its last meeting in Harare in early December 1999, JMC adopted for approval by the Political Committee papers submitted by its four working groups on the following questions:

(a) Determination of humanitarian corridors, release of hostages, exchange of prisoners of war and working relations with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);

(b) Working out mechanisms and budget estimates for disarming, tracking down and quartering of armed groups, as well as procedures for handing over mass killers, perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other war criminals, and disarming all Congolese civilians who are illegally armed;

(c) Drafting mechanisms and procedures for the disengagement of forces;

(d) Working out mechanisms, procedures and a calendar of the withdrawal of foreign forces and the mechanism for monitoring their implementation.

4. JMC adopted a proposal for the peaceful resolution of the situation at Ikela, where Congolese, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops are encircled by rebel forces (see para. 13 below).

5. JMC also addressed the question of the stationing of United Nations liaison officers within Democratic Republic of the Congo territory pursuant to resolution 1258 (1999), by which the Security Council authorized the deployment, as security conditions permitted, of United Nations military liaison officers to the rear military headquarters of the main belligerents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to other areas the Secretary-General deemed necessary. In that context, JMC discussed the further deployment of its own regional structures, accompanied by OAU observers, within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. JMC endorsed the reconnaissance and possible dispatch of United Nations military liaison officer teams to Bukavu, Bunia, Kabalo, Kisangani, Bumba, Gemena, Isiro, Kamina, Kalemie, Kindu, Lubumbashi, Mbuji Mayi and Pepa, and requested MONUC to submit proposals for the future reconnaissance and dispatch of teams to Mbandaka, Matadi, Likasi and Dilolo. With some assistance from MONUC, JMC has already deployed regional JMCs and OAU observers at Lisala, Boende and Kabinda.

6. In order to expedite its operations and improve its response to the changing situation on the ground, JMC set up a working group, chaired by Angola, to draft an organizational and operational structure for JMC, together with a budget estimate, and to submit it for adoption by JMC and approval by the Political Committee.

7. The Lusaka Agreement provides for the holding of an inter-Congolese national dialogue leading to national reconciliation. To that end, a neutral facilitator was to be chosen by the parties, and OAU was then to assist the Democratic Republic of the Congo in organizing inter-Congolese political negotiations under the aegis of the facilitator.

8. On 15 December, the Secretary-General of OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim, following consultations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) (Goma), RCD-mouvement de libération (RCD-ML) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), announced that the parties had agreed that the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, should assume the role of the neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese political negotiations. As provided for by the Lusaka Agreement, besides the Congolese parties, the dialogue will include the political opposition and representatives of the forces vives.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY SITUATION

9. The military and security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has deteriorated since my last report, dated 1 November 1999 (S/1999/1116).

10. In November, according to various reports available to the United Nations, the Government launched an offensive from Mbandaka into territory held by MLC in Equateur province, apparently in response to perceived infiltrations on the part of MLC forces into its territory. According to information provided by MLC to United Nations military liaison officers based in Gbadolite, fighting between government troops and MLC in Libanda and Makanza, to the north of Mbandaka, resulted in heavy casualties. However, this information could not be confirmed.

11. Heightened military activity by some of the "armed groups" defined in the Lusaka Agreement has also been reported in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. These include the former Rwandan government forces and Interahamwe militia, Burundian rebels and various Mayi-Mayi groups. Rebel sources also say the armed groups have acquired new equipment, including radios and uniforms, and have engaged in planning for military activity in South Kivu and Burundi. Following allegations that the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have also been arming, training and supplying these armed groups (see, for example, S/1998/1096), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have strongly denied such reports.

12. Reports from South Kivu strongly suggest the danger of large-scale violence among different ethnic groups there. On 29 December 1999, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo convened a press conference in Kinshasa to announce the alleged burial alive of 15 women in Kivu province by rebels, apparently on suspicion of having been in contact with Mayi-Mayi forces. The rebels have denied the accusation. The Government has appealed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate the alleged atrocity, and Congolese women's groups demonstrated for several days in protest in this connection outside MONUC headquarters in Kinshasa. An alleged massacre of 23 women and three children was also reported near the town of Kalima, north-east of Kindu, allegedly carried out by rebels on 14 December. The victims were accused of complicity with the Mayi-Mayi (see sect. VII below).

13. A force of about 700 Congolese, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops has been encircled at Ikela by rebel forces and has been running short of supplies. Pursuant to a decision made by JMC at its December meeting in Harare, MONUC has been participating in an effort led by the interim Chairman of JMC, Brigadier General Timothy J. Kazembe of Zambia, to achieve a peaceful resolution of the situation. However, MONUC has also received reports indicating that a military solution is being pursued to relieve the encircled troops.

IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS

14. On 11 December 1999, my Special Representative, Kamel Morjane (Tunisia), assumed his duties in Kinshasa. On the same day, he met with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, who was visiting the

Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of his tour of the subregion. Mr. Morjane has also met with President Kabila and other senior officials.

15. The difficulties experienced by the preliminary United Nations deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in positioning military liaison officers at the rear military headquarters of the belligerents and other key locations are described in my last report (S/1999/1116, paras. 18-20). They related primarily to the need to secure all the necessary guarantees of security and freedom of movement for the operations of the technical survey team dispatched to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to inspect the locations at which it was proposed to deploy United Nations personnel and to assess the military, political, logistics and infrastructure situation there. Civilian staff experts in child protection, humanitarian affairs and public information also accompanied the technical survey team.

16. In order to help overcome these difficulties, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Moustapha Niasse, visited Kinshasa from 3 to 10 November and raised the issue with President Kabila. Following his visit, the technical survey team has been able to visit seven locations in rebel-held territory and one in Government-held territory. Teams of United Nations military liaison officers have since been positioned at the following eight locations: Gbadolite, Goma, Kananga, Kindu, Gemena, Isiro, Lisala and Boende, and it is intended to position a team at Kabinda later in January. However, proposed visits to important locations such as Mbuji Mayi, Mbandaka, Lubumbashi and Matadi have yet to be approved by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. RCD (Goma) has insisted that United Nations personnel be positioned at additional locations on Government-held territory in order to ensure a balanced deployment. The number of United Nations military liaison officers currently deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the capitals of the belligerent parties and elsewhere in the subregion is 79 (see annex).

17. On the basis of the information sent back from their deployment locations by the teams of military liaison officers and data available in the capitals of the surrounding countries and in Kinshasa, MONUC has built up a picture of the military, logistical and humanitarian situation of many of the locations considered important to United Nations deployment. Though this picture is incomplete and much work remains to be done in order to assemble all the necessary information, it is in many respects quite detailed. The concept of operations presented below is based on the partial data gathered so far.

V. RELATIONS WITH OAU, JMC AND THE PARTIES

18. As was pointed out in my report of 1 November 1999, the proper implementation of the Lusaka Agreement requires very close coordination and cooperation between the United Nations, the parties, JMC and OAU. The United Nations, at Headquarters and through MONUC, has continued to do everything possible within its mandate and resources to develop this coordination and cooperation. MONUC provides substantial assistance to JMC on a routine basis.

19. Early in November, MONUC deployed two military liaison officers at Addis Ababa in order to improve links between the United Nations and OAU. MONUC officers provided training to the OAU observers deployed by JMC to serve with the regional offices of JMC at Boende, Lisala and Kabinda, and provided substantial assistance in their deployment to those locations. The United Nations officers deployed in Lusaka to ensure liaison with JMC have been tasked to assist in the establishment of a 24-hour operations room to enable JMC to receive information from its teams in the field. The co-location of United Nations military liaison officer teams with the regional JMCs is improving the flow of information to JMC headquarters in Lusaka.

20. On 22 December 1999, I wrote to the current Chairman of OAU and the Secretary-General of OAU to point out the importance and urgency of establishing JMC as a standing body at the earliest possible time. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations wrote at that time to the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the signatory countries stating MONUC's readiness to deploy to sites within the Democratic Republic of the Congo pursuant to resolution 1258 (1999) and requesting their cooperation to that end.

21. In response to an invitation issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Assistant Secretary-General of OAU, Said Djinnit, and General Rachid Lallali, the Chairman of JMC, visited United Nations Headquarters on 12 January for consultations. The object of the discussions was to identify further ways in which the United Nations could assist JMC to establish itself as a permanent structure on a fully operational basis.

22. Mr. Djinnit and General Lallali stressed their willingness to work closely with the United Nations and with MONUC but also described the severe constraints imposed on them by the shortage of resources. Despite the pledges received from a number of donors, JMC lacked the funds necessary to carry out effectively the tasks required of it under the Lusaka Agreement. They appealed for further assistance from the international community. For its part, MONUC will continue to provide technical assistance to JMC and OAU observers deployed with the regional JMC structures within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and to explore ways to improve the functioning of JMC by integrating its tasks, including command and control and information flow, with those of MONUC.

23. In order to assist JMC to assume its tasks under the Lusaka Agreement, MONUC is prepared to deploy additional military officers to support its activities. The officers would be located initially in Lusaka but would accompany JMC to its eventual headquarters location in Kinshasa. They would assist in the analysis of information provided by the military observers.

VI. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

24. There are some 960,000 internally displaced persons in eight of the 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and over 300,000 refugees from six of its nine neighbouring countries. Recent humanitarian assessments reveal that over 2.1 million people (internally displaced persons, refugees, urban vulnerable) or 4.3 per cent of the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo face critical food insecurity. Another 8.4 million (mostly urban

populations and farmers in the proximity of the frontline), or 17 per cent of the population, face moderate but rapidly growing food insecurity.

25. The current rigid monetary policies pursued by the Government continue to impede traditional commercial exchange and the import of foodstuffs. Prohibitive transport costs caused by inflation and oil shortages have dramatically driven up staple food prices. Major food shortages are reported in urban areas. With agricultural produce unable to reach markets in recent weeks, owing to fighting in food producing areas, the situation has worsened; it is compounded by impassable roads and the onset of the rainy season.

26. The official exchange rate set by the Government of 4.5 CFA francs to the United States dollar imposes very heavy costs on MONUC and the United Nations agencies operating in Kinshasa, since the actual rate of exchange is some 28 CFA francs to the dollar. The costs imposed by this policy have led some agencies to consider suspending operations in the country.

27. A recent nutritional survey in Bas-Congo in western Democratic Republic of the Congo revealed high levels of chronic and acute malnutrition in children under five, which is particularly alarming given that Bas-Congo is traditionally the country's breadbasket and a major supply source for Kinshasa.

28. The World Food Programme issued a press release in December 1999 announcing that while access had improved to some war-affected populations, aid agencies were struggling to reach the country's interior and unless new funds were made available immediately, 350,000 people living in precarious circumstances would struggle to survive.

29. A major improvement in funding and resources is needed to address the humanitarian needs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Nations Consolidated Appeal for 2000 was launched at Geneva in December 1999, requesting $71.3 million. The 1999 Consolidated Appeal for $38.6 million had only a 17-per-cent response rate, making it impossible to provide the necessary life-saving interventions.

30. Recent exceptional floods and river overflows in Kinshasa created an additional group of approximately 9,000 vulnerable families in several areas of the capital city. The Governments of Belgium, France, Japan, the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Community Humanitarian Office and United Nations agencies contributed over $500,000 to address immediate humanitarian needs.

VII. HUMAN RIGHTS

31. During the period under review, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on 17 December 1999, freed 156 political prisoners, some of whom had been held without trial for months. The majority were activists of the Unified Lumumbiste Party (PALU) or of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS).

32. On the occasion of the fifty-first anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1999), the Government decided to declare a moratorium on capital sentences handed down by the Military Court of Justice (Cour d'ordre militaire). It has to be recalled that some 100 individuals were executed in 1999, following capital verdicts pronounced by that Court, whose statute prohibits any appeal.

33. A seminar organized in Kinshasa by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with a view to facilitating the adoption of a national plan of action for the protection and promotion of human rights was held, from 8 to 10 December 1999. Some 100 participants, including government officials and representatives of civil society, attended the seminar. The national plan, which was adopted unanimously, set up priorities for the period 2000-2002 in the fields of rule of law, administration of justice, human rights education and the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights.

34. Despite the above-mentioned positive developments, the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains a matter of serious concern. Arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and restrictions imposed on the right to freedom of expression and opinion continue to be reported.

35. In mid November, 15 Congolese women were allegedly buried alive in Mwenga, South Kivu province, currently under the control of RCD. This act has been attributed to Rwandese soldiers. According to a Congolese non-governmental organization, which released the names of 14 of the victims, the women were accused of providing support to Mayi-Mayi warriors fighting against RCD forces.

36. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed its great concern over the incident and addressed a letter to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, requesting an international inquiry and a strong condemnation by the international community. RCD (Goma) has reportedly launched its own inquiry into the allegations.

37. As provided for in the MONUC mandate, a first group of human rights officers will shortly be deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in order to address the current precarious human rights situation.

VIII. CHILD PROTECTION

38. Children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been victimized through displacement (the majority of the displaced are children and women), separation from and loss of families, physical injuries, and exposure to chronic violence and forced recruitment into fighting forces. Thousands serve as combatants with the various fighting forces. Unaccompanied minors have been reported in large numbers in Kivu, Kasai and Orientale provinces, among other areas.

39. Although children remain extremely vulnerable, the response to the 1999 Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal has been poor. The recruitment of child soldiers continues, especially in the east of the country. A Forum on the

Demobilization of Child Soldiers and the Protection of Human Rights was organized on 10 December 1999 by the Congolese Ministry of Human Rights, supported by UNICEF. This step, together with the release of political prisoners mentioned above, has been viewed very positively.

40. To ensure that the lives of children are protected, it will be necessary to act before the fragile Ceasefire Agreement further erodes. With civilian child protection personnel authorized under resolution 1279 (1999) in place, MONUC could commence collecting data on child combatants and other child protection concerns. It could also assist the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and United Nations agencies in putting together a national plan for the demobilization of child soldiers and bring to the attention of JMC violations of children's rights by the various armed forces operating within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These activities would require the deployment of further civilian child protection officers, along with the necessary support personnel and equipment, alongside military liaison officers in various locations within the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

41. Their main tasks would include ensuring a comprehensive approach to child protection throughout all stages of the making and consolidation of peace and complementing the work of the UNICEF country office and its programme of cooperation. This would involve, inter alia, ensuring that all personnel involved in United Nations peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building activities receive appropriate training on the protection and rights of children.

IX. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION

42. In July 1997, the Government initiated activities aimed at the demobilization and rehabilitation of approximately 75,000 soldiers of the former Forces armées zaïroises (FAZ). In response to the Government's request, the World Bank allocated a grant from its Post-Conflict Fund in the amount of $700,000 to assist the Government in programme preparation. Simultaneously, UNICEF engaged in the demobilization and reintegration of ex-child soldiers from former government forces, first on a limited scale in Bukavu and Goma, later as a concerted national effort. The resumption of hostilities in August 1998 effectively delayed both efforts.

43. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement allowed both activities to move forward, through, inter alia, the Forum on the Demobilization of Child Soldiers, mentioned in paragraph 39 above. At the same time, the Government and the World Bank restructured the grant in view of the changed circumstances. The demobilization and reintegration of former combatants is now being planned in two phases. The first phase would aim at the demobilization and reintegration of special vulnerable groups (children, the handicapped, the chronically ill, the aged etc.). The second phase would be linked to the full implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and the reform of all armed forces, as envisaged in chapter 10 of the Lusaka Agreement, and would aim at the demobilization and reintegration of combatants not retained in the unified army. Phase II would also address the reintegration needs of members of armed groups to be demobilized and disarmed under chapter 9 of the Lusaka Agreement.

44. Preparation for the first phase is about to commence and will be undertaken as a joint effort between the Government and the international community. The key ministries involved include Human Rights, National Defence and Social Affairs. Implementation of the grant will be managed by the International Labour Organization in close collaboration with the World Bank, UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Health Organization and other United Nations agencies.

Conditions for demobilization

45. The first phase of demobilization would require cooperation from all belligerent parties for the transparent and efficient identification and demobilization of the special target groups, the freedom of movement of ex-combatants to their selected community of reintegration, and a stable security situation. The second phase would depend on the unification of forces as per the Lusaka Agreement, military restructuring under a unified command, the completion of a transparent identification and registration process, and the successful implementation of chapter 9 of the Lusaka Agreement on the disarmament of armed groups. The attainment of these objectives will, of course, depend not only on the full commitment of all the parties to carrying out the Lusaka Agreement but also on the agreement by the armed groups themselves to be disarmed and demobilized. Much work remains to be done in this respect.

X. NEXT STEPS

46. In my 1 November 1999 report, I sought from the Security Council prior authorization to deploy up to 500 military observers, with the necessary support and protection. I pointed out that, in order to be effective, the military observers would require protection and considerable logistical support, including vehicles and communications, as well as additional air assets to ensure their deployment, supply, rotation and, if necessary, extraction. A medical unit should also be deployed in support of the mission.

47. Pursuant to resolution 1279 (1999), I initiated the administrative steps necessary for the equipping of up to 500 United Nations military observers with a view to facilitating future rapid United Nations deployments as authorized by the Council.

48. I had indicated in my report of 15 July (S/1999/790) that the deployment of military observers, should the Council so decide, would constitute the second phase of United Nations involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, security and other conditions permitting. In my report of 1 November 1999 (S/1999/1116) I also envisaged, subject to further progress in the peace process, reverting to the Council with a further report containing recommendations and a proposed mandate and concept of operations for an enlarged United Nations deployment.

49. It must be said that, while progress has been made in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, some setbacks have unfortunately been registered. In order to enable MONUC to perform all the tasks required of it by

the Security Council, it is essential that the necessary security and real freedom of movement for United Nations and OAU personnel be assured. The fighting that has continued in some parts of the country and the obstacles and delays encountered in receiving the necessary clearances still constitute problems in that regard.

50. With heavy fighting around Mbandaka in Equateur province and indications that the armed groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement have received new arms and training, and given the difficulties encountered by MONUC in its efforts to deploy across the country, there appears to be a need for the renewed commitment of the parties to the Agreement they signed in Lusaka. In this context, the efforts made and initiatives taken by important regional actors should be noted. President Chiluba and President Bouteflika have done much to move the process forward, and President Mbeki has called for the urgent convening of a summit meeting aimed at ensuring the speedy implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, an initiative which I support.

51. With the renewed commitment of the parties to the Lusaka Agreement, fully supported by the international community, diplomatic activity may yet succeed in resolving the crisis. The parties should know - and the recent fighting has furnished fresh evidence of this - that there is no military solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The people of that country, and of the other belligerent States, need peace in order to channel their energies towards development. It is therefore incumbent on the United Nations to continue to do its utmost to support efforts for peace, including the deployment of a peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Potential for action by the United Nations

52. The signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement had in mind a specific set of tasks for the United Nations. If the Agreement is to be carried out as signed, the formidable tasks expected of the United Nations will need to be carefully evaluated. In particular, it will be necessary to reflect on the question of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the armed groups in order to develop a realistic plan of action.

53. The United Nations can potentially play an important role if it receives the necessary mandate and resources. Under such conditions, it will certainly be necessary to envisage a large-scale United Nations peacekeeping operation. Its main objectives would be as follows:

(a) To assist the belligerents to complete the disengagement and withdrawal of their forces in reasonably secure conditions;

(b) To provide security for the operations of United Nations military personnel;

(c) To contribute to the eventual disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, including the armed groups identified in the Lusaka Agreement.

54. In order to execute such a programme, a clear political agreement on the part of all concerned is necessary. As noted above, the World Bank has already commenced work on elements of a demobilization and reintegration plan.

55. As was already foreseen, the political context, as well as the political, military and logistical constraints, justify a step-by-step approach adapted to the situation.

Logistical situation

56. The road system throughout the country is in extremely poor condition, with long impassable stretches and broken bridges. Road journeys between cities can be undertaken only with great difficulty and can last days or even weeks, with no certainty of success. Conditions are even more difficult during the rainy season, which is always prevalent in one part of the country or another.

57. The railway system is patchy, dilapidated and serves only a few routes. Both rolling stock and rails are reported to be in very poor condition. Many routes have become unusable owing to the effects of war and lack of maintenance, while services on those lines that are still open are underfunded, slow and of limited capacity.

58. The main surface transport medium in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the extensive system of inland waterways, based on the River Congo and its tributaries. River barges vary in size, with carrying capacity of up to 600 tons. Barges can travel in groups of up to five or six vessels pushed by a single tug, at a rate of five to eight knots. Travel time on one of the shorter routes, from Kinshasa to Mbandaka, was estimated at 10 to 20 days, depending on conditions, though it is believed possible to reach Kisangani from Kinshasa in only 10 days if security is guaranteed. There appears to be no restriction on the commodities that can be carried. However, at the present time the River Congo is open only as far as Mbandaka because of the fighting in Equateur Province.

59. As a result of the difficulties associated with the surface transport infrastructure, air transport has become the most important means of travel within the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Usable airfields are located in all the major population centres. However, navigational aids are not widely available, and aviation fuel can be obtained commercially only at Kinshasa.

Next stage of deployment: concept of operations

60. The next stage of MONUC's deployment is based on the following assumptions:

(a) The parties will respect and uphold the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and the relevant Security Council resolutions;

(b) The JMC, with support from MONUC, will develop a valid plan for the disengagement of the parties' armed forces and their redeployment to assembly areas or JMC-approved defensive positions;

(c) The parties will be committed to contributing to the security of United Nations personnel but may not be entirely able to do so.

61. MONUC will also have to complete the reconnaissance of the intended deployment locations and the positioning of its teams in the rear military headquarters, as stipulated by the Council in resolution 1258 (1999).

62. Even given the willingness of the parties to provide security for MONUC personnel, the levels of insecurity, the degraded infrastructure and the difficult terrain in the country will require the deployment of formed units to protect military observers and civilian staff and to facilitate their activities. For this purpose, it is envisaged that a total force of 5,537 officers and men will be required.

63. This force will be deployed in four reinforced protected infantry battalion groups numbering a total of 3,400 troops. In order to make optimum use of the extensive inland waterway system, the force will also include two marine companies of 150 troops each, with four boats per company. As indicated in earlier reports, there will be 500 military observers. The force headquarters unit will comprise 95 officers, and the four sector headquarters will be staffed by 40 officers each. The force will also need two level II medical units (35 staff each), as well as units responsible for communications, air operations, movement control and aviation.

64. Even assuming the use of the inland waterways, it is envisaged that, in view of the poor state of the roads and the size of the country, MONUC will need very substantial aviation assets, including light and medium helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The fixed-wing aircraft will have to fly hundreds of sorties to deploy and sustain the military units.

65. The main military tasks of the expanded MONUC will be:

(a) To establish contacts and maintain continuous liaison at the field headquarters of all the parties' military forces and with the Joint Military Commission;

(b) To assist the parties in developing modalities for the implementation of the Agreement through the collection and verification of military information on the parties' forces and to develop plans to maintain the cessation of hostilities, disengage the parties' forces, and redeploy the forces to defensive positions or assembly areas;

(c) To facilitate, monitor and report on the cessation of hostilities;

(d) In cooperation with the Joint Military Commission, to investigate violations of the Ceasefire Agreement;

(e) To verify the disengagement of the parties' forces;

(f) In cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, to facilitate the release of prisoners of war and military captives as necessary;

(g) To supervise and verify the redeployment of the parties' forces to defensive positions or administrative assembly areas;

(h) Within its capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian operations;

(i) To support the operations of United Nations civilian staff;

(j) To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;

(k) To prepare for the next phase of United Nations deployment.

66. The United Nations operation described above represents the minimum strength required for the tasks envisaged at this time. Additional tasks - including facilitating the eventual disarmament and demobilization of armed groups and monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of foreign forces - will require the approval of the Council for a larger operation. An operation of the size currently envisaged will permit United Nations personnel to operate within the vicinity of the battalions only if the parties can guarantee their security.

67. It should be understood that United Nations formed units would not serve as an interposition force nor would they be expected to extract military observers or civilian personnel by force. They would not have the capacity to protect the civilian population from armed attack. MONUC military units would be able to escort humanitarian assistance convoys only within the limits of their means and under favourable security conditions.

68. It is envisaged to locate the battalions near the current or potential areas of operation of the military observers and civilian personnel. Those locations would include Mbandaka, Kisangani and Mbuji Mayi. The fourth location should be in the south-east of the country at a site yet to be surveyed, probably in territory controlled by the rebels. Any battalion located in that part of the country would need to use the logistical facilities of Lubumbashi.

69. The military observers would establish regular contacts with their counterparts in the armed forces of the parties and would provide most of the information on their positions and movements. It is envisaged that the United Nations observers would at all times operate under the protection of the parties and would conduct frequent risk assessments.

70. The task of the marine units would be to observe, monitor and verify the activities of the parties' military forces on the rivers and waterways of the country, and to facilitate movement by water of United Nations personnel, under the protection of the parties.

71. As the use of landmines has been a feature of the conflict in certain areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a mine action capacity would be established as part of the expanded MONUC. In addition to mine clearance and unexploded ordnance disposal specialists, who should be deployed in the reinforced battalions in order to meet their operational needs, a mine action office should be set up within the Mission. Aimed at developing a planning capacity in the field of mine action, its primary objective would be to assess

the real scope of the landmine and unexploded ordnance issue by establishing a mine information system. It would also act as the mission coordinator for mine action activities to be implemented by MONUC, non-governmental organizations, and United Nations and non-United Nations humanitarian agencies operating in country. In this connection, it would particularly focus on mine/unexploded ordnance awareness training for MONUC personnel. Finally, once the real situation had been assessed, the mine action office would contribute to developing a strategy to meet any short, medium and long-term requirements for mine/unexploded ordnance action in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

72. Along with the increase in its military activities, the expanded United Nations mission would also be expected to assume enhanced responsibilities in the fields of humanitarian assistance, human rights monitoring, and the protection of children, including child soldiers. The expanded mission should therefore be staffed and equipped accordingly. To ensure that its role would be properly understood by the Government and people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in order to disseminate information concerning that role, the mission would need to be equipped with an adequate public information component, including radio stations. A status-of-forces agreement would have to be drawn up with the Government, reflecting the mission's mandate and activities.

73. Progress thereafter would depend on the ability of the parties to abide by the terms of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, including the disengagement of their forces along confrontation lines. If United Nations personnel are enabled to perform their mandated functions under conditions of adequate security and freedom of movement, I would then be in a position to consider recommending to the Council the next phase, which would involve the deployment of a larger United Nations peacekeeping operation to assist the parties in carrying out the remaining provisions of the Agreement.

74. It is evident that the problem of the armed groups, including the former Rwandan government forces and Interahamwe militia, is a key factor in the conflict in the subregion, since it undermines the security of all the States concerned. It is essential to resolve this question in order to establish a lasting peace. A plan of action must be devised to facilitate the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and, as required, reintegration process for the armed groups.

75. In order to pursue the full implementation of the Lusaka Agreement, it also appears necessary to make progress in the inter-Congolese dialogue to be undertaken under the auspices of the neutral facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire.

76. It is vital to create the conditions for a lasting peace in the subregion based on the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. The elements of such a peace would eventually include the security of borders of the States concerned, their territorial integrity, and their full enjoyment of their natural resources. In order to help achieve these objectives, it will be important to convene, at the appropriate time, a regional conference on security and stability.

XI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

77. Pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1258 (1999), 1273 (1999) and 1279 (1999), I have obtained from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions commitment authorities totalling $41.0 million for the United Nations preliminary deployment in the Congo subregion and for the establishment and maintenance of MONUC for the period from 6 August 1999 to 1 March 2000, inclusive of funds necessary for the equipping of 500 military observers and additional 100 civilian support personnel expected to be deployed subject to a further decision by the Council. To ensure that the Mission is provided with resources to fulfil its mandate, I intend to seek assessment of these requirements from the General Assembly during its resumed fifty-fourth session.

78. Should the Council approve my recommendation contained in paragraph 83 below, I shall inform the Council of the related requirements and shall seek additional resources from the General Assembly accordingly.

79. As at 31 December 1999, the total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,482.1 million.

XII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

80. The deployment of additional United Nations military personnel should contribute to restoring and maintaining momentum for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. In this connection, the signatories bear a crucial responsibility for ensuring the implementation of the Agreement. It is on the basis of their renewed and strengthened commitment to the Agreement they have signed that the international community will be ready to lend its full support and allocate the significant resources that will be required. In this context, no new military offensives should be launched, the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel should be guaranteed, and the spreading of hostile propaganda, especially incitements to attack unarmed civilians, should cease.

81. The parties can also demonstrate their full commitment to their Agreement by making use of the modalities contained in it. In this regard, JMC's initiative to resolve the encirclement at Ikela is encouraging. I applaud the action taken in this context by the Government of Zambia, and particularly by the interim JMC Chairman, Brigadier General Timothy Kazembe, and wish them success. In view of its essential role, the Joint Military Commission, which is a key instrument, must very soon be established on a permanent basis, able to react swiftly to events and provide credible and authoritative decisions. Efforts to integrate its activities with those of MONUC should continue.

82. The inter-Congolese dialogue to be conducted under the auspices of the neutral facilitator, with the assistance of OAU, is an indispensable step towards national reconciliation and lasting peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The designation of Sir Ketumile Masire as the neutral facilitator for the inter-Congolese dialogue has elevated the prospect that the other main pillar of the Lusaka peace process will now be implemented,

with the assistance of OAU. The United Nations is committed to cooperating with OAU in supporting the facilitator.

83. The regional efforts and initiatives undertaken in support of the peace process, including those by Heads of State in the region, are to be commended. I also welcome the initiative of the Government of the United States, President of the Security Council for the month of January 2000, in encouraging the belligerent parties to recommit themselves to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. Subject to agreement by the parties to taking the steps outlined above, I recommend the deployment of four reinforced protected infantry battalion groups, accompanied by up to 500 military observers, two marine companies and the supporting military personnel and equipment, and the additional civilian personnel required, as described in paragraphs 62 to 72 above. I will provide the Council as soon as possible with a statement of the estimated cost implications of these proposals (in an addendum to the present report).

84. Until the full deployment of a United Nations force, the role of the Joint Military Commission will remain crucial. In order to permit JMC to fulfil its functions under the Lusaka Agreement, I reiterate my appeal to donors to provide it with the resources, in funding or in kind, to support its operations.

85. In my report of 15 July 1999 (S/1999/790, para. 15), I stated that, in order to be effective, any United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whatever its mandate, would have to be large and expensive. It would require the deployment of thousands of international troops and civilian personnel. It would face tremendous difficulties, and would be beset by risks. Deployment would be slow. This assessment has been amply borne out by the information provided so far by MONUC personnel, particularly on the military and logistical situation in the country. On that basis, it might be added that the deployment of a MONUC peacekeeping operation will also create inflated expectations that might well be unrealistic.

86. Nevertheless, it cannot be too often repeated that the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement remains the best hope for the resolution of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, for the time being, the only prospect of achieving it. This month will provide the leaders of the countries concerned with a unique opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to the Agreement and, eventually, to peace and stability in the Central African subregion.

87. Lastly, I take this opportunity to wish my Special Representative, Kamel Morjane, every success in his challenging assignment, and to express to the military and civilian officers of MONUC my deepest appreciation for the efforts they have made over the past few months, often under extremely trying circumstances, to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council.

Annex

United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: contributions as at 12 January 2000

	Military liaison	Troops	Civilian police observers	Total
Algeria	7	--	--	7
Bangladesh	4	--	--	4
Benin	4	--	--	4
Bolivia	1	--	--	1
Canada	1	--	--	1
Egypt	3	--	--	3
France	3	--	--	3
Ghana	4	--	--	4
India	5	--	--	5
Italy	1	--	--	1
Kenya	1	--	--	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1	--	--	1
Mali	2	--	--	2
Nepal	2	--	--	2
Pakistan	8	--	--	8
Poland	1	--	--	1
Romania	5	--	--	5
Russian Federation	3	--	--	3
Senegal	5	--	--	5
South Africa	1	--	--	1
Sweden	1	--	--	1
United Republic of Tanzania	2	--	--	2
United Kingdom	6	--	--	6
Uruguay	4	--	--	4
Zambia	4	--	--	4
Total	79	--	--	79

Map No. 4121 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS
January 2000

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/31
17 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION OF SIERRA LEONE ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to inform you that the Government of Sierra Leone endorses the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in his second report on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) dated 11 January 2000 (S/2000/13), in particular paragraph 29 on the expansion of UNAMSIL up to 11,100 military personnel.

The Government of Sierra Leone is grateful for current efforts by the Security Council to address the security concerns of the Government of Sierra Leone, taking into account the planned withdrawal of Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) troops from Sierra Leone.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) SAMA BANYA (Dr)
Minister of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation

00-24439 (E) 170100

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/32
17 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 17 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to call your attention to the declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Angola, issued on 17 January 2000 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) António MONTEIRO
Permanent Representative of Portugal
to the United Nations

00-24459 (E) 170100 170100

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Angola, issued in Brussels on 17 January 2000

The European Union has been following closely the situation in Angola. The European Union is aware of the significant developments registered on the military front and remains convinced of the need for a political solution to bring a lasting peace to the country, allowing stability and progress for the Angolan people.

The European Union reiterates that the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) under the leadership of Dr. Jonas Savimbi, by failing to comply with key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, bears the prime responsibility for the war in Angola. By acting in persistent defiance of the Security Council resolutions, Dr. Savimbi has deliberately chosen the path of conflict instead of fulfilling his undertakings, a course of action which casts legitimate doubts as to whether he really intends to work towards national reconciliation in Angola.

The European Union urges UNITA to cease immediately its military activities and reaffirms its determination to continue supporting all the international efforts to tighten the Security Council sanctions against UNITA.

The European Union appeals to all those within UNITA who stand ready to abide by the rules enshrined in the Lusaka Protocol to demonstrate their unequivocal will to enter into a meaningful dialogue with the Government, and encourages the Angolan authorities to respond favourably to that commitment.

The European Union encourages the Angolan Government to create the appropriate political, social and economic environment for democracy and the rule of law to flourish in Angola. In this regard, the European Union believes that the Government has a special responsibility for the promotion of human rights, including in those areas which were under UNITA's control, of democratic principles, good governance and the strengthening of a free civil society.

The European Union calls again on the Government, as a signatory to the Ottawa Convention, and in particular on UNITA, to cease immediately mine-laying activities in the country.

The European Union is concerned at the recent fighting between Angolan Armed Forces and UNITA across international borders and stresses the importance of stability and inter-State dialogue and cooperation for the security and economic development of the region.

The European Union will be ready to consider how to assist the Government of Angola in facing the challenges of rebuilding and reconstructing the country within a democratic environment. Particular attention will continue to be given

to humanitarian assistance in order to alleviate the suffering of the Angolan population affected by the conflict.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated countries Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, and the countries of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/33
18 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 18 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement by the Government of Burundi on the question of protected sites (see annex).

I should like this statement to be brought to the attention of all members of the Security Council and to serve as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Marc NTETURUYE
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-24704 (E) 190100 190100

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Annex

Statement by the Government of Burundi on protected sites, issued at Bujumbura on 17 January 2000

The Government of the Republic of Burundi calls the attention of national and international public opinion to the following:

- The measures taken to place people in protected sites have in all cases had one objective: to protect the civil population, who are often used by the rebels as human shields in the event of contact with units of the national army, and to protect people from being massacred by the rebels.

- These measures have already borne fruit in the provinces of Bubanza, Kayanza, Karusi and rural Bujumbura.

- In the particular case of the province of rural Bujumbura, such measures have two features:

  - They constitute a response to the sufferings of the population, who were regularly subjected to plunder and held to ransom by the rebels;

  - They are temporary, since they will be lifted as soon as the security situation becomes stabilized.

The security dimension must be borne in mind as a matter of priority, but must nevertheless be constantly evaluated.

- With regard to the province of rural Bujumbura, the inhabitants go about their daily tasks, including work in the fields, and there is near-normal functioning of schools, health centres and markets.

- The Government undertakes to conduct an overall assessment of the protected sites with a view to progressively dismantling them.

- In addition to the government delegations which each week have visited the various protected sites to evaluate people's needs and to ensure the necessary follow-up, the President of the Republic this week convened a special session of the National Assembly with a view to, inter alia, setting up a parliamentary commission to inquire into the state of health of those people who have been regrouped and transferred to protected sites.

- Given the current evolution of the security situation in the province of rural Bujumbura, the Government will in two weeks' time begin dismantling the protected sites wherever it considers that conditions for doing so exist. This will be carried out in a fully transparent manner.

- The Government reaffirms that the regrouping of people in protected sites is not connected with any policy designed to coerce them in any way whatsoever.

Indeed, the Government of Burundi is fully aware that, in accordance with its international obligations, it cannot order the civilian population to move for reasons relating to conflicts except where this is dictated by the people's security needs or by overriding military considerations.

With regard to the living conditions of those who have been regrouped, the Government has guaranteed them to the best of its ability, and will continue to seek support from its partners in order to provide the necessary assistance to those still in protected sites.

The Government takes this opportunity to reiterate the urgency of convincing all armed factions to come to the negotiating table so as to cease hostilities, provide the population with a minimum level of security, and thereby avoid the need for protected sites.

- As security conditions improve, the regroupment sites will be closed.

- The Government of Burundi, engaged as it is in the peace process, hopes that this will succeed without delay.

- For the Government and people of Burundi, the successful outcome of the peace process will mean the restoration of peace, the return of the refugees and their reintegration, the reinstallation of displaced persons and the rehabilitation of the socio-economic life of the country.

- The Government earnestly appeals to the international community to support this wide-ranging programme, the ultimate aim of which is the reconciliation of the Burundian people and the reconstruction of the country.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/34
5 February 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998, 1181 (1998) of 13 July 1998, 1231 (1999) of 11 March 1999, 1260 (1999) of 20 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999 and 1270 (1999) of 22 October 1999 and other relevant resolutions and the statement of its President of 15 May 1999 (S/PRST/1999/13),

Affirming the commitment of all States to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel adopted on 9 December 1994,

Welcoming and encouraging efforts by the United Nations to sensitize peacekeeping personnel in the prevention and control of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases in all its peacekeeping operations,

Taking note of the letter to its President from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Sierra Leone of 17 January 2000 (S/2000/31),

Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 23 September 1999 (S/1999/1003), 6 December 1999 (S/1999/1223) and 11 January 2000 (S/2000/13) and the letter of the Secretary-General to its President of 23 December 1999 (S/1999/1285),

Determining that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

1. Notes that the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as established by resolution 1270 (1999) is in the process of completion;

2. Welcomes the efforts made by the Government of Sierra Leone, the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front Party of Sierra Leone, the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States and

UNAMSIL towards the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed in Lomé on 7 July 1999 (S/1999/777);

3. Reiterates its call upon the parties to fulfil all their commitments under the Peace Agreement to facilitate the restoration of peace, stability, national reconciliation and development in Sierra Leone, and stresses that the responsibility for the success of the peace process ultimately lies with the people and leaders of Sierra Leone;

4. Notes with concern that, despite the progress that has been made, the peace process thus far has been marred by the limited and sporadic participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, by the lack of progress on the release of abductees and child soldiers, and by continued hostage-taking and attacks on humanitarian personnel, and expresses its conviction that the expansion of UNAMSIL as provided for in paragraphs 9 to 12 below will create conditions under which all parties can work to ensure that the provisions of the Peace Agreement are implemented in full;

5. Notes also with concern the continuing human rights violations against the civilian population of Sierra Leone, and emphasizes that the amnesty extended under the Peace Agreement does not extend to such violations committed after the date of its signing;

6. Calls upon the parties and all others involved to take steps to ensure that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is fully implemented throughout the country, and in particular urges the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Civil Defence Forces, the former Sierra Leone Armed Forces/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and all other armed groups to participate fully in the programme and cooperate with all those responsible for its implementation;

7. Takes note of the decision of the Governments of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana to withdraw their remaining ECOMOG contingents from Sierra Leone, as reported in the letter of the Secretary-General of 23 December 1999;

8. Expresses its appreciation to ECOMOG for its indispensable contribution towards the restoration of democracy and the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Sierra Leone, commends highly the forces and the Governments of its contributing States for their courage and sacrifice, and encourages all States to assist the contributing States further in meeting the costs they have incurred in making possible the deployment of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone;

9. Decides that the military component of UNAMSIL shall be expanded to a maximum of 11,100 military personnel, including the 260 military observers already deployed, subject to periodic review in the light of conditions on the ground and the progress made in the peace process, in particular in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, and takes note of paragraph 33 of the report of the Secretary-General of 11 January 2000;

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decides further that the mandate of UNAMSIL shall be revised to include the following

additional tasks, to be performed by UNAMSIL within its capabilities and areas of deployment and in the light of conditions on the ground:

(a) To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport;

(b) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares;

(c) To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme;

(d) To coordinate with and assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities;

(e) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction,

authorizes UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfil the additional tasks set out above, and affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone;

11. Decides further that the mandate of UNAMSIL, as revised, shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of adoption of this resolution;

12. Authorizes the increases in the civil affairs, civilian police, administrative and technical personnel of UNAMSIL proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 11 January 2000;

13. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General, as indicated in his report of 11 January 2000, to establish within UNAMSIL a landmine action office responsible for awareness training of UNAMSIL personnel and for the coordination of mine action activities of non-governmental organizations and humanitarian agencies operating in Sierra Leone;

14. Stresses the importance of a smooth transition between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL for the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement and the stability of Sierra Leone, and in that regard urges all those concerned to consult over the timing of troop movements and withdrawals;

15. Reiterates the importance of the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, notes that the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF have agreed in the Peace Agreement to provide guarantees in this regard, and calls upon all parties in Sierra Leone to respect fully the status of United Nations and associated personnel;

16. Reiterates its request to the Government of Sierra Leone to conclude a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary-General within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, and recalls that pending the conclusion of such an agreement the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) should apply provisionally;

17. Reiterates also the continued need to promote peace and national reconciliation and to foster accountability and respect for human rights in Sierra Leone, and urges the Government of Sierra Leone, specialized agencies, other multilateral organizations, civil society and Member States to accelerate their efforts to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Commission and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace as fully-functioning and effective institutions, as provided for under the Peace Agreement;

18. Emphasizes the importance of the exercise by the Government of Sierra Leone of full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources for the benefit of the people of the country and in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 6, of the Peace Agreement, and to that end calls for the early and effective operation of the Commission of the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development;

19. Welcomes the contributions that have been made to the multi-donor trust fund established by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to finance the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and urges all States and international and other organizations which have not yet done so to contribute generously to the fund so that the process is adequately financed and the provisions of the Peace Agreement can be fully implemented;

20. Underlines the ultimate responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone for the provision of adequate security forces in the country, calls upon it, in that regard, to take urgent steps towards the establishment of professional and accountable national police and armed forces, and stresses the importance to this objective of generous support and assistance from the international community;

21. Reiterates the continued need for urgent and substantial assistance to the people of Sierra Leone, as well as for sustained and generous assistance for the longer terms tasks of peace-building, reconstruction, economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone, and urges all States and international and other organizations to provide such assistance as a priority;

22. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council every 45 days to provide, inter alia, assessments of security conditions on the ground so that troop levels and the tasks to be performed by UNAMSIL can be kept under review, as indicated in report of the Secretary-General of 11 January 2000;

23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/2000/35
18 January 2000
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 17 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 15 January 2000 from Mr. Taha Yasin Ramadan, Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the hostile policies of the United States and the United Kingdom towards Iraq and the habitual manner in which they politicize the memorandum of understanding and the oil-for-food programme and transform the programme into a means of causing further damage to Iraq and its people.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Saeed H. HASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

00-24711 (E) 200100 200100

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Annex

Letter dated 15 January 2000 from the Vice-President of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

During the implementation of phases I to VI under the memorandum of understanding concluded by Iraq and the United Nations Secretariat on 20 May 1996, the Government of the Republic of Iraq has been careful to comply with the provisions of the memorandum as a temporary and exceptional measure. It has cooperated fully with the relevant United Nations agencies in exploring and discussing the requirements of the sectors covered by the procurement and distribution plans with a view to securing the items in question within the period of time designated for each phase so as to meet some of the basic needs of the people of Iraq. A review of the manner in which the six phases have been implemented shows that some parties in the Security Council, specifically the United States of America and the United Kingdom, have been trying to raise all manner of obstacles to the processing of numerous contracts in each of the phases and have been doing so for dubious political purposes with the objective of politicizing the memorandum of understanding, a measure that was originally designed to meet some of the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) have placed on hold many contracts submitted in different time periods. The status of contracts as of 21 December 1999 indicates that 813 phase III, IV, V and VI contracts are on hold and that they have a total value of 1,180 million dollars. This is despite the fact that the relevant Iraqi authorities responded immediately to all the questions, customary or contrived, that had been raised by the Committee. In placing the contracts on hold, the United States and British representatives used arguments that have no legal or technical foundation. Indeed, they always proceed on the basis of tendentious political considerations that are incompatible with the letter and spirit of the memorandum of understanding. The Americans and British also seek to impede the supply of essential spare parts to the Iraqi oil sector, and this has reduced its capacity to produce and export. This hostile attitude has also led to a shortage of the funds necessary to pay for the requirements of all the other sectors covered by the procurement and distribution plan and consequently to an inability to meet obligations required to secure even a small part of our people's needs.

In its many letters addressed to the Secretariat and the Security Council, the Government of Iraq has called attention to this unlawful conduct on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom. Regrettably, there does not appear to be any prospect for a serious endeavour on the part of the Security Council or the Secretariat to put a halt to such behaviour. Indeed, we have noted that some of those in the Office of the Iraq Programme attempt from time to time to make contrived excuses for such conduct in their fear of the power and influence the United States wields in the Organization.

The trivial reasons given by the United States and its creature the United Kingdom as pretexts for placing contracts on hold can for the most part be reduced to the claim that information is missing from contracts and the unsubstantiated allegation that certain items are of dual use. Such claims and

allegations are groundless, and they amount to interference in the functions of the Secretariat and the Office of the Iraq Programme. The procedures adopted by the Committee for the implementation of the programme (S/1996/636, annex) state that, before its submission to the Committee, "experts in the Secretariat examine each contract, in particular the details of price and value, and whether the items to be exported are on the categorized list" submitted by Iraq and approved by the Secretary-General (para. 34 [i.e. 33]). It is clear from the foregoing that the responsibility for ascertaining that the contracts submitted meet the conditions set forth in the Committee's procedures and conform with the distribution plan rests with the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, however, choose to ignore the distribution plan approved by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Thus the conduct of the American and British representatives in the Committee lacks any legal or technical basis, and they have placed on hold contracts that extend over the phases we have indicated and are worth some 1,180 million dollars. This indicates in a manner that leaves no room for doubt that Washington and London are proceeding on the basis of hostile and incoherent political considerations against the people of Iraq and are striving for a goal they have no power to achieve, no matter how much brute strength they may possess, and that is to undermine the resistance and staying power of the people of Iraq and its insistence that the unjust embargo imposed on our homeland be reversed.

The hostile political considerations that govern overall United States and British policy towards Iraq are well known to all. The two aggressor States do not conceal them, and indeed they have been maintaining their military aggression against our people on a daily basis ever since 1991 by means of the no-flight zones imposed in northern and southern Iraq by the unilateral and unlawful decision of the two Governments and in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

The processing of the contracts submitted to the Committee through its secretariat by the various sectors covered by the procurement and distribution plan takes a long time, and especially so the approval stage. The delay in the approval of contracts can be 6 to 12 months or more. In phase IV, 988 contracts were submitted to the secretariat of the Committee and the Committee approved 690 of them; in phase V, 1,248 contracts were submitted to the secretariat of the Committee and the Committee approved 934 of them; and in phase VI, 1,439 contracts had been submitted to the secretariat of the Committee as of 10 January 2000, and the Committee had approved 656 of them. These include contracts for the food and medicine sectors and for other humanitarian supplies. In the case of the oil sector: 574 contracts were submitted to the Committee in phase IV and the Committee approved 452 of them; in phase V, 636 contracts were submitted and the Committee approved only 346 of them; and in phase VI, 759 contracts have been submitted and only 92 have been approved.

I should like to refer to the fact that on 29 November 1999 the representative of the United States placed on hold a Ministry of Agriculture contract with a French company for the importation of 15 live bulls for purposes of insemination and the improvement of livestock quality on the pretext that

bulls have dual-use potential. This is a glaring example and is to be regarded as reflecting contempt on the part of the representative of the United States for the functions of the Secretariat, the procedures of the Committee and resolution 1051 (1996) concerning the dual-use categories.

The Government of Iraq brings to your attention all of these irrefutable facts. They demonstrate that the programme has not and cannot succeed in eliminating the great human suffering that has been borne by the people of Iraq for nearly 10 years and that the parties in the Security Council hostile to Iraq are seeking to transform the programme from, despite its modesty and lack of significance, a means of alleviating the suffering of our people, as they have claimed, into a means of harming us and exerting pressure on us so as to advance their malicious political objectives and cause further damage to our people and our homeland.

The attached tables (see enclosure) show the number and value of the contracts submitted to the secretariat of the Committee, approved by the Committee and placed on hold by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom in phases III, IV, V and VI.

(Signed) Taha Yasin RAMADAN
Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq

Enclosure

Status of contracts under the memorandum of understanding as of 10 January 2000

1. Phase IV (general contracts)

Contracts submitted to the Committee secretariat	988	$1 621 392 435
Contracts approved by the Committee	695	$1 576 241 154
Contracts on hold	22	$36 614 843

2. Phase IV (oil contracts)

Contracts submitted to the Committee secretariat	574	$299 681 396
Contracts approved by the Committee	452	$249 733 942
Contracts on hold	87	$47 692 493

3. Phase V (general contracts)

Contracts submitted to the Committee secretariat	1 248	$2 162 112 301
Contracts approved by the Committee	934	$1 562 286 071
Contracts on hold	168	$488 390 499

4. Phase V (oil contracts)

Contracts submitted to the Committee secretariat	636	$333 980 137
Contracts approved by the Committee	346	$157 780 942
Contracts on hold	209	$111 963 697

5. Phase VI (general contracts)

Contracts submitted to the Committee secretariat	1 439	$3 018 984 388
Contracts approved by the Committee	656	$1 326 167 902
Contracts on hold	255	$568 205 782

6. Phase VI (oil contracts)

Contracts submitted to the Committee secretariat	759	$603 897 061
Contracts approved by the Committee	92	$173 185 709
Contracts on hold	134	$47 808 811

Phase V

Sector	Contracts on hold	Value of contracts
Agriculture	6	$5 163 796
Education	10	$6 921 633
Electricity	63	$217 437 679
Food	5	$2 075 500
Food-related supplies	15	$41 448 068
Medicine	50	$84 125 463
Communications	6	$93 105 194
Water and sanitation	22	$62 349 941
Total	177	$512 627 273

Phase V: Oil

Sector	Contracts on hold	Total value
Oil	210	$117 297 369.10

Phase VI

Sector	Contracts on hold	Value of contracts
Agriculture	50	$79 518 683
Education	18	$10 313 151
Electricity	64	$190 649 197
Food	3	$969 600
Food-related supplies	30	$71 627 392
Medicine	31	$39 521 694
Communications	13	$13 203 803
Water and sanitation	10	$30 462 272
Total	219	$436 265 790

Phase VI: Oil

Sector	Contracts on hold	Total value
Oil	80	$22 381 555.81

Status of contracts on hold as of 21 December 1999

Phase III

Sector	Contracts on hold	Value
Education	2	$1 015 000
Electricity	3	$3 664 255
Food	3	$2 913 750
Medicine	5	$1 931 043
Water and sanitation	2	$421 422
Total	15	$9 945 470

Phase IV

Sector	Contracts on hold	Value
Education	4	$2 181 000.00
Electricity	4	$1 625 095.00
Food	2	$624 500.00
Food-related supplies	2	$15 132 460.15
Medicine	7	$5 182 225.29
Water and sanitation	4	$11 903 012.80
Total	23	$36 648 293.24

Phase IV: Oil

Sector	Contracts on hold	Total value
Oil	89	$48 512 285.07

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/2000/36
18 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JANUARY 2000 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF NAMIBIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward the text of the final communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the Southern African Development Community, held in Maputo on 16 January 2000, for circulation to members of the Security Council and for distribution as a document of the Council (see annex).

(Signed) Martin ANDJABA
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

00-24698 (E) 180100

/...

Annex

Final communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the Southern African Development Community, held in Maputo on 16 January 2000

1. At the invitation of the President of the Republic of Mozambique, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, in his capacity as Chairman of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), an Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of State or Government was held in Maputo on 16 January 2000.

2. The objective of the Summit was to evaluate the degree of implementation of the Lusaka Agreement of 10 July 1999 on the ceasefire in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/1999/815, annex) and to review the work of the commissions set up within the framework of the said Agreement concerning the modalities and mechanisms of its implementation, with a view to the adoption of appropriate measures for the rapid normalization of the situation in that SADC member country.

3. The Summit was attended by the following Heads of State or Government:

Angola: President José Eduardo dos Santos;

Botswana: President Festus Mogae;

Lesotho: Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili;

Malawi: President Bakili Muluzi;

Mozambique: President Joaquim Alberto Chissano;

Namibia: President Sam Nujoma;

South Africa: President Thabo Mbeki;

United Republic of Tanzania: President Benjamin William Mkapa;

Zambia: President Frederick Chiluba;

Zimbabwe: President Robert Mugabe.

4. The Summit was also attended by Barnabas S. Dlamini, the Prime Minister of Swaziland, and Rajkeswur Purryag, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mauritius.

5. Also in attendance as special guests were President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Pasteur Bizimungu of Rwanda.

6. The Summit was also attended by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, the Acting Executive Secretary of SADC, Prega Ramsamy, and the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire.

7. The Summit applauded the appointment of the former President of Botswana by the Congolese parties as the facilitator of the national dialogue between the political forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and considered that his appointment would contribute to the expeditious implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement so that a global solution to the conflict could be reached.

8. The Summit noted with concern the lack of progress in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999.

9. The Summit reiterated the importance and validity of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July as a fundamental instrument for the process of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this connection, it urged the signatories to cooperate in a more active manner towards its full and successful implementation. For that purpose, an urgent meeting of the belligerents will soon be convened to speed up the implementation of the Agreement.

10. The Summit reaffirmed the importance of the involvement of the United Nations, OAU, SADC and the whole international community in the search for a global and lasting solution to the conflict. The Summit encouraged them to continue their political and diplomatic efforts aimed at the achievement of the intended results.

11. The Summit called upon the Security Council to send urgently a full peacekeeping force to the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as to provide the necessary logistical means for its operation in the context of the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement.

12. The Summit appealed to the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees and displaced populations in cooperation with humanitarian assistance organization, as well as to provide resources for the process of national reconstruction.

13. The Summit expressed its expectation that the Security Council, at its session to be held on 24 January, would further deliberate towards this direction.

14. The Summit thanked the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and President Joaquim Alberto Chissano for the hospitality and facilities made available for the success of the deliberations of the Maputo Extraordinary SADC Summit.

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S/2000/37
19 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 17 January 2000 from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations stating that Mr. Andrey S. Zykov has been appointed alternate representative of the Russian Federation on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

00-24881 (E) 190100

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S/2000/38
19 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES OF UKRAINE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a note verbale dated 17 January 2000 from the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations stating that Mr. Oleksandr D. Shevchenko, Mr. Oleh V. Herasymenko, Mr. Vsevolod O. Sobko and Mr. Vyacheslav V. Yatsyuk have been appointed alternate representatives of Ukraine on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

00-24887 (E) 190100

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S/2000/39
19 January 2000

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1255 (1999) of 30 July 1999, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31 January 2000 and requested me to continue to keep it regularly informed and to report three months from the date of the adoption of the resolution on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia. Pursuant to that request, I submitted a report to the Security Council on 22 October 1999 (S/1999/1087). The present report provides an update of the situation as at 19 January 2000.

2. UNOMIG is headed by my Special Representative for Georgia, Dieter Boden, who assumed his duties on 24 November 1999. He was assisted until 31 December 1999 by Major General Tariq Waseem Ghazi as Chief Military Observer, who concluded his assignment after 14 months of exceptional and dedicated service. His successor is Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa (Pakistan). The strength of UNOMIG, as at 20 January 2000, stood at 101 military observers (see annex).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

3. Since he assumed his duties, my Special Representative has met with the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov. He has also met with other representatives of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, the Russian Federation, in its capacity as facilitator, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the members of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General. All these interlocutors pledged to support him in his efforts towards reinvigorating the peace process. They also expressed their readiness to work simultaneously on several key issues: improving the security situation, providing for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, improving economic conditions and preparing the ground for a comprehensive political settlement, including the political status of Abkhazia, Georgia.

4. During the meetings, there was general agreement on the need to make full use of the existing machinery of the peace process. Subsequently, the negotiating process was resumed on 18 and 19 January 2000, after a nine-month hiatus, when the ninth session of the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides was convened at Tbilisi under the chairmanship of my Special Representative. Participants included the Georgian delegation, led by State Minister Vazha Lordkipanidze, the Abkhaz delegation, led by de facto Prime Minister Viacheslav Tsugba, and representatives of the Russian Federation as facilitator, OSCE and the group of Friends of the Secretary-General. In connection with the Council's session, the leaders of the Abkhaz delegation were received by President Shevardnadze.

5. During the session, which was organized around small bilateral working groups focused on specific issues, the two sides expressed their commitment to continuing their dialogue on practical questions. Concretely, they reached agreement on (a) the protocol establishing a mechanism for joint investigation of violations of the Moscow Agreement and other violent incidents in the zone of conflict; (b) the disinterring and reburial of Georgian remains buried near Sukhumi and assistance from the Georgian side in locating the buried remains of Abkhaz killed during the war; and (c) further steps for the rehabilitation and use of the Inguri dam and power station.

6. The sides also agreed to renew negotiations on a draft document on peace and the non-resumption of hostilities. Furthermore, they requested my Special Representative to carry out preparatory work for a third meeting on confidence-building measures, on the basis of his report on this question. The report, which had been distributed to the members of the Coordinating Council in December 1999, reviews the extent to which the confidence-building measures agreed on by the sides have been implemented and proposes steps for further action.

7. In parallel to the work on practical matters through the Coordinating Council mechanism, my Special Representative called repeatedly for work to proceed on issues relating to the comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia, on the basis of the principles of Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity. In pursuance of Security Council resolution 1255 (1999), a draft document entitled "Basic principles for the distribution of constitutional competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi" has been submitted for comments to the representatives of the Russian Federation as facilitator, OSCE and the group of Friends of the Secretary-General. It is envisaged that, at a later stage, ways of moving this issue forward will be explored with the two sides. Until now, however, the Abkhaz side remains very reluctant to discuss the distribution of constitutional competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.

8. In December 1999, the New York representatives of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General informed the Secretariat that they had agreed to approve the request of the Government of Ukraine, which became a member of the Security Council on 1 January 2000, to take part in their work.

9. In the Georgian parliamentary elections of 31 October 1999, in which some 67.7 per cent of the eligible population took part, the ruling Citizens Union of

Georgia won a clear majority in the 235-seat parliament. Only two others, the Revival bloc led by Aslan Abashidze, Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Ajaria, and the Industry Will Save Georgia party, received the minimum 7 per cent of the votes required to qualify for the 150 seats allocated by proportional representation. No elections were held for the districts of Abkhazia and the parliamentarians already representing those constituencies retained their seats.

10. Following the Abkhaz "presidential elections" of 3 October 1999, an "inauguration" ceremony was held at Sukhumi for Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba on 6 December. In subsequent days, Mr. Ardzinba reshuffled some members of his "government". A key change was the replacement of de facto Prime Minister Sergei Bagapsh, who in that capacity had led the Abkhaz delegation in the Geneva peace process, by Viacheslav Tsugba.

11. Georgia and the Russian Federation agreed, in the margins of the OSCE Istanbul Summit (16-17 November 1999), in a joint statement annexed to the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, that the Russian Federation would withdraw two of its four military bases in Georgia by 1 July 2001, including the base at Gudauta, in Abkhazia, Georgia.

III. OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA

12. UNOMIG continues to perform its mandate without structural changes and within the concept of "limited patrolling" introduced in February 1998 (see S/1998/497, para. 9). The opening of the team bases in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors remains under constant review in the light of the operational necessities and security considerations. However, under the present circumstances the Chief Military Observer does not see the need to reactivate them. For reasons of security (see para. 24 below), it is intended to close the team base in the Kodori Valley.

13. UNOMIG has expanded the use of its helicopters since they are essential for access to remote areas and to areas such as lower Gali where the mine threat is significant. The helicopters also project a visible United Nations presence over the entire area of responsibility of UNOMIG and give it the capacity to rapidly deploy personnel to a trouble spot, as needed.

14. The joint fact-finding mechanism, which includes representatives of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, UNOMIG and the collective peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has continued to operate on an ad hoc basis, helping to clarify the facts surrounding violations of the Moscow Agreement of 14 May 1994 and other violent incidents in the zone of conflict. To date, 14 investigations have been initiated, and in four cases suspects have been detained by law enforcement agencies. Representatives of the two sides at the local level continue to express their support for the work accomplished by the joint mechanism. At the recent meeting of the Coordinating Council, agreement was reached on a protocol providing a formal framework for the joint investigation mechanism (see para. 5 above).

15. On 5 November 1999, the Russian Federation decided to close the Russian-Georgian border at the Psou River to all crossings, including by UNOMIG personnel and vehicles. This decision has blocked a possible exit route from the zone of conflict and is seriously complicating the procurement of supplies for the Mission. Consultations are under way with the authorities of the Russian Federation to resolve this issue.

IV. SITUATION ON THE GROUND

16. The general situation in the UNOMIG area of responsibility has remained calm but unstable throughout the reporting period, and there were no serious violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement. Predictions of an aggravation of the situation in connection with the parliamentary elections of 31 October in Georgia proved to be unfounded.

17. Two significant violent incidents during the reporting period were related to the laying and explosion of anti-tank mines near the village of Achigvara (Gali sector) in the Restricted Weapons Zone. In the first incident, on 1 December 1999, five persons were killed. In the second, on 1 January 2000, a civilian bus detonated a mine on the main trunk road through the area, the M27, fortunately without causing serious casualties. The explosion occurred shortly before the passage of a UNOMIG patrol vehicle, whose occupants were able to assist the passengers of the bus. Another serious incident was the abduction on 17 January of two UNOMIG observers in Gali city (see para. 22 below). These incidents created serious concern about security in the area and hindered the activities of the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations.

18. Implementation of some of the measures of the protocol of 24 September 1998 on stabilization of the situation along the line of separation of forces (see S/1998/1012, para. 7) is proceeding. In November 1999, Georgian Ministry of the Interior troops were withdrawn from their posts along the ceasefire line. On the Abkhaz side, there are currently no militia posts close to the ceasefire line. While undirected shooting across the line continues to occur frequently, incidents of targeted shooting have been rare.

19. The high level of criminal activity along and across the ceasefire line and the lack of effective action and mutual cooperation by the law enforcement agencies on both sides continues to be a cause for serious concern. A series of tit-for-tat kidnappings occurred in December 1999 when six persons were abducted in the Gali sector and five in the Zugdidi sector. Negotiations on the release of these hostages are continuing. There has also been a spate of criminal lootings by bandit groups in the Gali sector. These crimes wax and wane seasonally and are believed to be linked to the mandarin harvest.

20. Meanwhile, despite the lack of proper security conditions for returning refugees and internally displaced persons, and the lack of a much-needed agreement on this issue, a process of administrative and economic normalization is under way in the Gali district, affecting positively the daily lives of its residents, who are showing some signs of optimism for a better future.

V. SECURITY SITUATION

21. The security and safety of UNOMIG personnel remain a high priority of the Mission's leadership. The mine explosion on 1 January 2000 that destroyed a local bus (see para. 17 above) has undermined confidence in the security of the main road through the Gali sector. The presence of a UNOMIG ballistic-protected patrol vehicle close to the incident was coincidental and, as the mine was pressure- rather than command-detonated, it seems that UNOMIG was not specifically targeted. As a security precaution after the incident, the Chief Military Observer temporarily restricted operations in and transit through the Gali sector.

22. On 17 January, two UNOMIG observers were abducted, held for two hours and then released unharmed by four armed and masked men in Gali city. The incident, in which UNOMIG was directly targeted, was assessed to be politically motivated and perhaps connected to the meeting of the Coordinating Council. All patrolling was therefore suspended for the time the Council was in session.

23. On 24 November, a vehicle of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was shot at by unknown individuals in Gali town. Investigations by the local authorities, monitored by UNOMIG, are ongoing but no motive has yet been established and the perpetrators have not been apprehended. The incident has had a negative effect on humanitarian activities.

24. Since the kidnapping of UNOMIG personnel on 13 October 1999 in the Kodori Valley (see S/1999/1087, para. 18), the Georgian authorities have been unable to provide unequivocal assurance for the security of a UNOMIG presence in the Georgian-controlled upper part of the valley. Accordingly, the Chief Military Observer has decided that the UNOMIG team base in the valley is to be closed. Since 13 December 1999, UNOMIG ground and air patrols in the Abkhaz-controlled lower part of the valley have resumed on the basis of the security provided by the CIS peacekeeping force and the Abkhaz authorities.

VI. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN GEORGIA AND THE COLLECTIVE PEACEKEEPING FORCE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

25. Good relations with the CIS peacekeeping force continued at all levels during the past three months. In the area of formal liaison, and on a more personal basis at the checkpoints, cooperation has been remarkably good while roles and operations have been kept distinct. The peacekeeping force has involved itself in local assistance projects and provided security assistance to UNOMIG and non-governmental organizations on request. The sharing of information of mutual interest and participation in joint investigations are examples of the mutually beneficial relations between UNOMIG and the CIS force. The recent rotation of parts of the peacekeeping force has not affected the excellent spirit of cooperation between the two operations.

VII. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

26. During the reporting period, international organizations continued to carry out humanitarian assistance programmes in Abkhazia, Georgia. Accion contra el Hambre operated canteens (soup kitchens) throughout the area and distributed dry food parcels and agricultural kits to certain beneficiaries. The International Committee of the Red Cross distributed dry food parcels and medications, visited prisoners and facilitated a messaging service. The Halo Trust continued to map and clear mine fields, and to conduct mine awareness training programmes. Médecins sans Frontières (France) distributed drugs throughout the region, including the Gali district, and administered a tuberculosis treatment programme in cooperation with the Abkhaz de facto Ministry of Health. Première Urgence resumed its emergency home repair programme for vulnerable families. The United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), with support from the United States Agency for International Development, administered a youth house in Sukhumi. In November 1999, UMCOR opened a second youth house, in Zugdidi, which was unfortunately severely damaged in a fire on 27 December.

27. The small but active non-governmental organizations in Sukhumi continued their work, with support from international organizations. One local non-governmental organization, funded by UNHCR, Peace and Accord, extended its programme of feeding the lonely elderly in hospitals and at home, and provided beneficiaries with canned fruits and vegetables, clothing and slippers for the holidays. Another local non-governmental organization, supported by OXFAM, created a database of spinal injury and disability cases in Abkhazia, Georgia, which will be used to provide better-targeted medical services. OXFAM also sponsored a conference that brought together women leaders from throughout Abkhazia. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs continued to monitor the overall humanitarian situation in Georgia. United Nations Volunteers continued to carry out capacity-building programmes for local non-governmental organizations and confidence-building measures. UNHCR continues to monitor the human rights situation in Gali and, in some cases, to intervene on behalf of internally displaced persons.

28. The continuing instability along the ceasefire line negatively influences the human rights situation in the area. During the reporting period, some cases of looting were accompanied by gratuitous cruelty and violations of the personal integrity of the victims, including women and children, and efforts by the law enforcement organs to stop such crimes have not yet had tangible results. The number of abductions for ransom has also increased. In one such case, the daughter of a UNOMIG local staff member was abducted and has now been missing for over two months. Here too, while in many cases the perpetrators or their accomplices are apparently known, the actions of the local authorities have not produced results. Failure to take necessary steps in such cases may lead to a spread of abductions.

29. In December 1999, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, under the auspices of its Technical Cooperation Project, organized a week-long human rights seminar for 20 representatives of institutes of higher learning. The participants evaluated the event as useful and timely. A round table organized by the Office to address the situation of minorities in Abkhazia, Georgia, has led to the establishment of a permanent public council on

minority issues, which includes representatives of different ethnic and religious societies. That Council will provide a forum for expressing views on the subject and for shaping public policy. The Office has begun translating several international human rights documents into the Abkhaz language. It has also begun drafting a plan of action for human rights education in schools, universities and law enforcement organs and selected for funding several local non-governmental organization projects.

VIII. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

30. The general economic situation in Georgia remained relatively stable during the reporting period, but essential structural reforms in all spheres of the economy have not yet been implemented. Early in December 1999, a mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced its intention to delay the provision of financial assistance to Georgia until such time as the Government and IMF reached an agreement on the provisions of the state budget. Delays continue in the payment of wages and pensions. The implementation of a successful tax-collection regime and the eradication of corruption have not yet been achieved.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

31. By its resolution 53/232 of 8 June 1999, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of US$ 31,000,479 (gross), equivalent to $2,583,373 per month for UNOMIG for the period from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2000. The assessment of these amounts is subject to the decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission.

32. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNOMIG beyond 31 January 2000, as recommended in paragraph 40 below, the cost of maintaining the Mission until 30 June 2000 would be limited to the monthly amounts approved by the General Assembly. I shall report to the General Assembly on the additional requirements needed, if any, for the maintenance of the Mission beyond 30 June 2000.

33. As at 31 December 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNOMIG amounted to $8.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.5 billion.

X. OBSERVATIONS

34. My Special Representative, with support from representatives of the Russian Federation, as facilitator, OSCE and the group of Friends of the Secretary-General, and with the good will of the two sides, is trying to move the peace process forward by reviving the machinery created since 1997 in the framework of the Geneva process. As an important step in this direction, the Coordinating Council and its working groups should continue to convene regularly, in accordance with the Council's statute, to provide a forum for both sides to exchange views and resolve specific issues regardless of perceived domestic

constraints. The constructive spirit that prevailed during the ninth session of the Coordinating Council and the concrete steps forward it produced give grounds for cautious optimism.

35. In parallel with the revival of the peace process machinery, my Special Representative has worked closely with the Russian Federation as facilitator, OSCE and the group of Friends of the Secretary-General to formulate proposals addressing the distribution of constitutional competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. The ultimate goal of the Geneva process is the comprehensive political settlement of the conflict and progress on the matter of status is an indispensable step towards that goal. The continuing reluctance of the Abkhaz side to discuss the matter is distressing.

36. The critical issue of the return of refugees and internally displaced persons whose continuing exile years after the cessation of hostilities remains an unacceptable tragedy, needs to be addressed urgently. I call on the two sides and the international community to find a formula for their return, in the first place to the Gali district in its old borders, so as to enable the international community to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance and to facilitate the establishment of proper security conditions. Since negotiations on earlier draft documents addressing these issues have reached a standstill, I urge the two sides to put forward and implement new approaches to resolve the problem of displacement, including the revival of Working Group II of the Coordinating Council.

37. As regards security, I welcome the recent progress made by the two sides on the establishment of a mechanism for joint investigation. The importance of concrete security measures, including measures to improve conditions for returnees to the Gali district, should be stressed, and I call on the sides to fully implement the protocol of 24 September 1998 (see S/1998/1012, para. 7) and to engage in frequent bilateral contacts regarding these issues, including at the local level. Full use should also be made of Working Group I of the Coordinating Council as a mechanism to discuss security issues.

38. The continuing steps towards full implementation of confidence-building measures on which the two sides have agreed, and the relationships they foster among members of various segments of society, are encouraging signs. I call on the sides to fully implement the measures on which they agreed during the Athens and Istanbul meetings. In this regard, the invitation of the Government of Ukraine to host the third meeting on confidence-building measures is appreciated.

39. Within the security-related limitations to its patrolling, UNOMIG is still able to carry out its core mandate effectively. Of major concern, however, is the prolonged absence of monitoring in the Georgian-controlled upper part of the Kodori Valley since the hostage-taking incident of 13 October 1999. The Georgian authorities are responsible for providing the necessary security conditions to enable the UNOMIG personnel to carry out their mandate in the Kodori Valley and they should take the necessary measures in this regard without delay. One indispensable step in this direction is the vigorous pursuit and prosecution of the perpetrators of the hostage-taking of 13 October, as well as

of those involved in earlier hostage-takings that occurred in areas under Georgian control.

40. UNOMIG continues to be a central element in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, especially through its monitoring presence on the ground. At the same time, through its sustained efforts to further the peace process, the Mission plays an essential role in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNOMIG for a further six-month period, ending on 31 July 2000.

41. In conclusion, I would like to commend the leadership and the entire personnel of UNOMIG for their dedication and professionalism in carrying out their mandate in difficult and sometimes dangerous circumstances. To Major General Ghazi, who has now returned to the service of his country, I would like to extend and to put on record my appreciation for his truly exceptional and inspiring contribution to UNOMIG.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia: contributions as at 1 January 2000

Country	Military observers
Albania	1
Austria	5
Bangladesh	7
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	5
Egypt	3
France	3
Germany	10
Greece	4
Hungary	7
Indonesia	4
Jordan	6
Pakistan	6
Poland	4
Republic of Korea	3
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	5
Switzerland	4
Turkey	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
United States of America	2
Uruguay	3
Total	101

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Department of Public Information
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